Richard McElreath (b. 1973), a professor of anthropology, points out that it is easy to overemphasize the logical aspect of science and under-emphasize the social aspects. According to McElreath, Karl Popper knew that science is not completely described by the falsification criterion: there can be legitimate debate about data—whether it is correct, or whether it has been correctly interpreted.[1]
Instead of being falsified by strict logic, hypotheses are falsified in practice by scientific consensus—a social phenomenon. It is when the scientific community begins to regard a hypothesis or model as wrong that it is considered falsified. In McElreath’s view, science is a process of argument, sometimes untidy and chaotic, working toward a consensus on a scientific question over time. These arguments play out in print and at scientific meetings. McElreath states that for this reason scientific knowledge is not definite, and a simplistic Popperian suggestion that science is strictly logical is harmful because it is a misrepresentation of the scientific process.[2]
This is an interesting thought. If science is a social phenomenon and most members of a scientific community are secular humanists, then we should expect that science will have a detectable secular humanistic bent. Conversely, if Christians were the dominant group in the scientific community, we would expect science to have a Christian flavor.
Criticism of Popper’s view is not confined to McElreath. For example, the distinguished Hungarian philosopher of science, Imre Lakatos (1922–1974), modified Popper’s view—in a nod to the realities of science—by suggesting that the falsification criterion is typically not applied to a smaller “hard core” of theories within a research program which the scientists regard as correct. Instead, falsification applies to a collection of “auxiliary hypotheses” which the scientists are less strongly attached to but are important because they allow empirical predictions to be made and tested.[3]
Combining the insights of Popper, Kuhn and McElreath, we conclude that although scientific models can be useful and provide important predictions, we must always reserve judgement in calling them “true”. They can be very firm, but we cannot close the gap to say they are “true” because of the problem of induction and the role of scientific consensus—a social phenomenon. Even some of the most certain hypotheses, such as Newtonian physics, have been replaced with better models.
Darwin’s theory of evolution is another case in point. It was formulated in ignorance of genetics, molecular biology, cellular biology and information theory. Will this theory, even in its twentieth century modified form (Neo-Darwinism) stand the test of time? Or will the scientific consensus move on?
We also note Feynman’s timely warning against “pseudoscience” that may appear at first glance to go through the motions, but on a closer view turns out to be less than honest. This rings true because it matches our experience of other fields—accountants, engineers and the like may appear to be practicing their discipline, but if they accede to political or other interference, their work must be called into question.
[1] McElreath, 2020, p. 4.
[2] Ibid, pp. 9–10.
[3] Musgrave & Pigden, 2023.